3 avr. 2016 | Par martine orange
- Mediapart.fr
Jusqu’où est prêt à aller le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) pour imposer ses vues sur le règlement de la question grecque ? Peut-être jusqu’à pousser la Grèce à la faillite, si l'on en juge par la lecture de la conversation de deux responsables de l’organisation internationale révélée par Wikileaks le 2 avril (lire ici l’ensemble de la transcription, en anglais). Pour obtenir un changement de direction, les responsables du FMI ne voient qu’un moyen : mettre en place une stratégie du choc pour imposer leur plan à la Grèce et à l’Europe, au mépris de tout système démocratique.
La conversation, retranscrite par Wikileaks, s’est tenue le 19 mars entre Poul Thomsen, responsable du département européen du FMI, alors à Washington, et Delia Velculescu, chef de la mission du FMI en Grèce, qui participe alors à une réunion des créanciers à Athènes. Tous les deux constatent que les conversations, comme d’habitude, font du surplace et que la situation en Grèce ne cesse d’empirer.
Poul
Thomsen et Delia Velculescu. © DR
Même si la question de la situation économique de la
Grèce, par
ailleurs abandonnée par l’Europe face à l’afflux de réfugiés, est
aujourd’hui totalement évacuée par les responsables européens, celle-ci n’en
continue pas moins d’être toujours aussi dramatique. Les deux responsables du
FMI estiment que le pays est au bord de l’effondrement, d’ici à l’été.
Rien ne leur convient. Le plan de sauvetage, décidé à l’arraché, le 13
juillet 2015, par les responsables européens, ne fonctionne pas – mais qui
s’en étonnera ? Ils ne croient ni aux objectifs fixés par les
Européens, notamment les 3,5 % du surplus budgétaire, ni aux chiffres
présentés par le gouvernement grec. Celui-ci, selon eux, traîne des pieds pour
mettre en place les réformes exigées. De leur côté, les responsables européens
ne se décident pas à faire un allègement de la dette, comme l’espère le
gouvernement d’Alexis Tsipras et comme le recommande le FMI. Cette fuite en
avant ne peut s’éterniser, estiment les deux responsables du FMI : la
Grèce doit rembourser en juillet 2,3 milliards d’euros à la Banque centrale
européenne (BCE). Elle sera sans doute dans l’incapacité de faire face à cette
échéance, à en croire les deux responsables.Pour Poul Thomsen, qui s’est illustré à maintes reprises par ses positions dures depuis le début de la crise grecque, il est urgent de précipiter les événements. L’ennui, d’après son analyse, est que le référendum britannique vient retarder ce « moment de vérité ». « Qu’est-ce-qui peut amener à prendre une décision ? Dans le passé, il n’y a qu’une fois où cela s’est produit, quand ils [les Grecs] étaient étranglés financièrement et sur le point de faire faillite ? Pas vrai ? » explique-t-il à sa collègue, selon la transcription de Wikileaks. « Et c’est certainement ce qui va se passer à nouveau. Dans ce cas, cela va traîner jusqu’en juillet. Les Européens ne vont pas avoir la moindre discussion un mois avant le Brexit. Ils voudront faire une pause et après, ils voudront recommencer après le référendum européen [prévu le 13 juin en Grande-Bretagne – ndlr] », poursuit-il.
Puis, Poul Thomsen continue à dérouler son plan à sa collègue, quasiment muette : il faut tordre le bras à l’Allemagne pour l’obliger à rallier les vues du FMI. « Les Allemands posent le problème du management et à ce moment nous disons : “Regardez, Mme Merkel, vous êtes face à une alternative. Vous devez réfléchir à ce qui est le plus coûteux : aller de l’avant sans le FMI […] ou accepter un allégement de la dette que nous pensons nécessaire en Grèce pour nous garder avec vous”. »
[[lire_aussi]]
Depuis le début de la crise grecque, l’Allemagne estime que la participation du FMI au plan de sauvetage et à la Troïka (Banque centrale européenne, Union européenne, Fonds monétaire international) est une condition impérative pour contribuer elle-même au plan de sauvetage. Dans le même temps, l’Allemagne – ainsi que plusieurs contributeurs européens, notamment les Pays-Bas, la Finlande et la Slovaquie – s’oppose à toute annulation de la dette grecque. Tout juste consentent-ils à un étalement dans le temps.
« Je suis d’accord, il faut un choc. Mais je ne sais pas lequel », répond Delia Velculescu, avant de mentionner une réunion sur la dette avec les membres de l'Eurogroup, prévue à la mi-avril à Washington. Mais pour Poul Thomsen, tout cela n’est pas de nature à changer la donne. « Les discussions sur la dette peuvent s’éterniser, jusqu’à ce que quelque chose advienne…, jusqu’à ce qu’ils [la Grèce] arrivent au paiement de juillet ou jusqu’à ce que les responsables décident que nous avons besoin d’un accord », explique-t-il.
Même si elle ne transparaît pas directement dans la conversation entre les deux responsables du FMI, il faut mesurer la violence qui sous-tend leurs propos. Le terme « event » (que nous avons traduit ici par “choc”) auquel ils font si souvent référence, est devenu désormais l’euphémisme préféré dans le monde financier pour parler d’une faillite, d’une banqueroute ou, selon une expression adoucie, d’un défaut de paiement. En d’autres termes, les responsables du FMI envisagent ni plus ni moins qu’une faillite de la Grèce, avec, comme l’année dernière, la fermeture des banques, des fermetures d’usines et de commerces, des milliers de chômeurs supplémentaires. Et cela même au moment où la Grèce doit gérer, quasiment seule, le sort de dizaines de milliers de réfugiés.
Mettre la Grèce à genoux leur semble la seule façon de l'amener, ainsi que l’Europe, à résipiscence. Car outre faire plier l’Allemagne et le reste de l’Europe, il s’agit aussi de faire plier le gouvernement grec, jugé bien trop dilettante. Certes, ils ont lancé des réformes, mais elles sont insuffisantes, selon eux. « Ils ont cédé un peu sur la réforme de l’impôt sur le revenu, sur les retraites complémentaires… Mais c’est très peu »,résume Delia Velculescu, estimant que la pression n’est pas assez forte sur le gouvernement grec pour l’amener à accepter plus.
Le plan du FMI est établi de longue date. Delia Velculescu le rappelle en quelques mots : « C’est très simple, il s’agit de la réforme des retraites, de celle sur l’impôt sur le revenu, de celle sur la TVA, de celle sur les salaires, et quelques taxes, une ou deux… C’est tout », explique-t-elle. C’est tout en effet. C’est juste l’ensemble des équilibres financiers, sociaux et démocratiques d’un pays qui est en jeu.
Le gouvernement grec a dénoncé le chantage du FMI, à la suite des révélations de Wikileaks. Le premier ministre Alexis Tsipras a écrit dès samedi à Christine Lagarde, directrice générale du FMI, pour lui demander si les propos rapportés des deux responsables reflétaient la position de l’ensemble de l’institution. « Utiliser un défaut de paiement comme moyen de pression sur la Grèce et sur les autres États membres est clairement au-delà des limites dans une négociation », accuse-t-il. De son côté, le ministre grec des finances, Euclid Tsakalotos, a accusé le FMI d'outrepasser son rôle et de vouloir imposer à la Grèce des mesures draconiennes, y compris sur les retraites.
Le gouvernement allemand, clairement dans la ligne de mire du FMI, n’a pas réagi pour l'instant aux révélations de Wikileaks. Le FMI se refuse également à le faire, expliquant qu’il ne commente jamais les fuites ou les discussions internes. Il lui faudra bien malgré tout s’expliquer. Doit-on comprendre que le sort de la Grèce et de l’Europe se décide, dans le secret, entre deux hauts fonctionnaires ? Pour son propre confort, le FMI est-il prêt à déstabiliser toute l’Europe ? Une nouvelle fois, la question démocratique est posée. Jusqu’à quand va-t-elle être éludée ?
URL
source: https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030416/grece-la-strategie-du-choc-imaginee-par-le-fmi
19 March 2016 IMF
Teleconference on Greece
WikiLeaks release: April,
2nd 2016
Keywords: IMF, European Union, Greece,
debt relief, Troika, Brexit,
Merkel, Sarkozy
Title: Transcript of an Audio
Recording of an internal IMF meeting
Date: March, 19th 2016
Link:
https://wikileaks.org/imf-internal-20160319
Pages: 7
Description
The IMF would like to put debt relief
for Greece
on the Troika-agenda. However, IMF officials are
worried that the EU is going to be
paralyzed in the first half of 2016 because of the looming Brexit
so that no decision is going to be
made as to Greece.
IMF Europe director Thomsen wants to pressure Merkel and reiterate to her that IMF leaving
the
Troika is going to look bad and is
going to lead to discomforting questions in the Bundestag.
Thomsen connects the debt relief question
loosely to the refugee question. He talks about the
refugees and then says that the IMF
will at the same time („we at the time say“) come in with their
demands and approach Merkel with the debt relief.
Background:
Merkel is generally considered a proponent of
the IMF participation in the Troika. She managed to
get the IMF in despite bitter
opposition by some European leaders like Sarkozy.
Merkel is considered somewhat undecided on
debt relief for Greece
(though apparently leaning
towards „no“ since she, like many of
her European counterparts, fears creating a precedent in
Europe.)
Title: 19 March 2016 IMF
Teleconference on Greece
-------- Mensaje reenviado --------
De: [redacted]@[redacted].es
Fecha: XX de marzo de 2016 XX:XX:XX GMT+1
Para: [redacted]@[redacted].es
Asunto: Re: Reunión de 19 de marzo
CC: [redacted]
[811_0221.MP3]
[Transcript of attachment by
WikiLeaks]
Participants:
• DELIA VELKOULESKOU, Head of IMF Representative Mission to Greece
• POUL THOMSEN, Director of the IMF’s European Department
• IVA PETROVA, IMF
THOMSEN: The thing that I am worried
about is that we are setting a date for the return of the
mission, when we might not have an
agreement inside the Troika on how to proceed.
VELKOULESKOU: But Poul, you suggested
this, so it is very hard to go back now on it.
THOMSEN: How are we going to pitch
this? What are we going to do?
VELKOULESKOU: I don't know. Of course
I don't want to come back so soon. I don't think that in
two weeks, or in ten days we will be
able to make more progress than we are now. But I feel
that otherwise, we would have been
stuck here in this situation anyway. And I feel that for
this next mission that, at least the
Europeans, are planning to... they have a deadline right?
They are planning to finish one way or
another by the spring meetings because of these
presumed talks on debt that are going
to take place by the spring meetings. So I don't know.
I feel that this pressure will come
anyway at some point on us, so... I don't know. I don't see
how this is going to evolve, but we
will have to come here at some point...
THOMSEN: But why? I mean, we can ...
We should have another meeting like we had in Brussels
and agree on how to proceed...
VELKOULESKOU: We can do that, and we
can have another document remotely, but we know it
doesn't work Poul, because these guys
agree on something and then they give it up the next
day. We have said this time and again,
we know that they don't do what we say: that we get
up and leave together. It just doesn't
function. For them everything is subject to change--if
the authorities want it.
THOMSEN: Can you change it so that it
doesn't have a specific date? For say, early April?
VELKOULESKOU: This is going to be a
disaster, if I try to do this tomorrow. They will not let us
go.
THOMSEN: Well, they have already let
you go...so that's... haha.
VELKOULESKOU: I think Poul you need to
discuss this at your level. I mean it will come back...I
think.. I don't know whether we can
avoid doing that at this stage.
THOMSEN: You mean going back?
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah.
PETROVA: Poul, I think that it is more
important to reinforce the message about the agreement on
the 2.5%, because that is not
permeating and it is not sinking very well with the
Commission. If they stick to this
agreement, I think that coming on the 2nd of April will be
fine. But, on our side, going back on
this date will really be a disaster.
THOMSEN: Well, you just blame it on
me, that's fine. When do they want to finish that mission?
VELKOULESKOU: They want to finish that
mission ideally by the 8th of April, so just a week. Or
by the 12th or the 13th. Remember on
the 6th and 7th of April they want to have this
Washington Group debt meeting on the
sidelines of the EWG [Eurogroup Working Group],
and then....
THOMSEN: So that means you have to
finish by the 6th...
VELKOULESKOU: No, no, no. We can
report progress on that EWG [Eurogroup Working Group]
and basically we need to have this
debt discussion that prepares the Ministers for the
following week, when they are thinking
about April 15th or 16th, on the sidelines of our
Spring meetings. So, essentially they
want to finish...
THOMSEN: Yeah, but our Spring meetings
start in the middle of the week of the 11th. That means
that you have to finish there by the
8th or 9th and be back by then.
VELKOULESKOU: Exactly we would need to
finish by the.. no.. 11th or 12th or so and then fly
directly to D.C. And we can finish
with an agreement or not, I mean we may can end up
where we are now in a way. And yes
there will be a huge amount of pressure and we want to
see how we will deal with it.
THOMSEN: That's what the block is
about, right?
VELKOULESKOU: That's right, that's
right. That's why we need to have it out - I agree with you -
as soon as possible. The Greek press
is full of acusations against us, of the income tax credit
and all of that, is here every day.
The other thing though that is not clear to me is how it will
pan out, is this discussion on the
target. On the 3.5 versus the 1.5 because for us this is also
very crucial.
THOMSEN: I can tell you how that is
going to turn out. There is no way that the member states are
going to accept to lower the target
for the program. This means that we will say that it does
not add up.
VELKOULESKOU: But can we do what you
suggested? Have two programs with two targets?
Even for the medium run?
THOMSEN: Yes, if the Europeans say
that it is our target that matters for their disbursement for
debt relief--but they are not going to
say that.
VELKOULESKOU: The question is whether
they could accept the medium term targets as the
Commission, for the purposes of the
program, and our targets for the purposes of debt relief.
THOMSEN:Wait a minute that's not...
for sure they need to accept our targets for the debt relief.
But if you go out and say for this
year for instance you say they will end up with what you
say, -0.5, -1 or something like that?
VELKOULESKOU: ... -0.5 let's say, if
they do all the measures.
THOMSEN: Ok, let's say -0.5 and the
Commission will say that they end up with zero or +0.25 or
whatever they have...
VELKOULESKOU: ... +0.5...
THOMSEN: Yes... you don't have a
finance program. Because they are time financing for
something that you say is not going to
happen.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah...
THOMSEN: So the program is not
financed and contingent debt relief... the debt relief is not
coming either, because they are not on
track to meet the criteria. That is the whole point.
They essentially need to agree to make
OUR targets the baseline and then have something in
that they hope that will overperform.
But if they don't, they will still disburse. Right?
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, that's right.
THOMSEN: They are not going to agree
to that.
VELKOULESKOU: No. The first question
is when is this thing going to be even discussed. Right?
Somebody needs to discuss it. I know
Thomas Wieser is setting up a call on the 30th of this
month.
THOMSEN: A call with whom?
VELKOULESKOU: I think it is an EWG
call. An EWG call on Greece..
on status or something like
that. Yeah, we need to ask Thomas.
THOMSEN: I mean.. he's not gonna... he
can set up all the calls he wants, but I know what is going
to happen. We are going to go to the
EWG, and I am going to say at the Eurogroup that
"This does not add up to 3.5 and
we will not go ahead, unless the Europeans lower their
targets to 1.5, as far as spacing the
disbursements are concerned". They are not going to do
that. They are going to say no, stack
more measures. That's clear, I have no doubt about that.
VELKOULESKOU: I don't know whether
they are going to say that, that is the question. They need
to take a stand on whether they believe
our projections or the Commission's projections.
THOMSEN: It is clear that they will
just keep the ball in play... and send the mission back.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, but we will do
what? Because, even if we agree on this 2.5, we are still
not there unless the targets are
agreed.
Paul THOMSEN: Well, then they will
send you back to find more hard measures and try to find a
compromise. That is exactly why I am
doing this like this. Let's get those 2.5% under the
belly, and I am sure they will press
for some more measures from some of the member
states. We will of course say, I will
say that "I don't think it is possible", I will say that "I
think we should base the program on
1.5", but I have no doubt that they will push us to go
out there.
VELKOULESKOU: So in any case we need
to come back and try to get this 2.5, and this is just in
the first stage as you say. Once it is
in the next stage, you know, it's not enough for that.
THOMSEN: For sure Delia, that is the
definition. I don't like to have you guys hanging out there, if
there is no agreement on how to
proceed.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, of course. We
don't want to be in that situation.
THOMSEN: We need to think about when
you come back... we should just put on the table what we
want.
VELKOULESKOU:We should.
THOMSEN: Instead of waiting for
them... I am not going accept a package of small measures. I am
not.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, no, understood. We
have told them, it is very clear what we have and
what we have in this note that we
agreed with the Europeans--which they are now
backtracking--but it is very simple it
is the pension reform, income tax credit, VAT and the
wage bill and there are some excises,
one or two... that's it. But on each of them we have
significant open issues which are all
political, as far as Greeks are concerned. And the other
question is about the DSA [Debt
Sustainability Analysis] and whether we will put it out at
some point.
THOMSEN: Well, I don't know. But this
is... I think about it differently. What is going to bring it all
to a decision point? In the past there
has been only one time when the decision has been
made and then that was when they were
about to run out of money seriously and to default.
Right?
VELKOULESKOU: Right!
THOMSEN: And possibly this is what is
going to happen again. In that case, it drags on until July,
and clearly the Europeans are not
going to have any discussions for a month before the
Brexits and so, at some stage they
will want to take a break and then they want to start again
after the European referendum.
VELKOULESKOU: That's right.
THOMSEN: That is one possibility.
Another possibility is one that I thought would have happened
already and I am surprised that it has
not happened, is that, because of the refugee situation,
they take a decision... that they want
to come to a conclusion. Ok? And the Germans raise
the issue of the management... and
basically we at that time say "Look, you Mrs. Merkel you
face a question, you have to think
about what is more costly: to go ahead without the IMF,
would the Bundestag say 'The IMF is
not on board'? or to pick the debt relief that we think
that Greece needs in order to keep us on
board?" Right? That is really the issue.
VELKOULESKOU: Correct!
VELKOULESKOU: When is that going to
happen? I don't know, I am surprised that it has not
happened yet. I would, for the sake of
the Greeks and everyone else, I would like it to
happen sooner rather than later.
VELKOULESKOU: I am hoping it's going
to happen with these debt discussions that are starting in
mid April.
THOMSEN: But that is not an event.
That is not going to cause them to... That discussion can go on
for a long time. And they are just
leading them down the road... why are they leading them
down the road? Because they are not
close to the event, whatever it is.
VELKOULESKOU: I agree that we need an
event, but I don't know what that will be. But I think
Dijsselbloem is trying not to generate
an event, but to jump start this discussion somehow
on debt, that essentially is about us
being on board or not at the end of the day.
THOMSEN: Yeah, but you know, that
discussion of the measures and the discussion of the debt can
go on forever, until some high up..
until they hit the July payment or until the leaders decide
that we need to come to an agreement.
But there is nothing in there that otherwise is going
to force a compromise. Right? It is
going to go on forever.
VELKOULESKOU: It will, yes, until
July, if nothing happens beforehand. I agree.
THOMSEN: OK. I don't know, let's see.
I hope for the sake of the Greeks that we are going to find
a solution soon... I mean, let's face
it, you guys are not going agreeon ... these discussions
that you have out there, they're not
going to lead to... they are not going to come around to
accept our views. Right? They are not!
VELKOULESKOU: No, they are not...
THOMSEN: And they are not even getting
close. Right?
VELKOULESKOU: They are not getting
close. What is interesting though is that they did give in...
they did give a little bit on both the
income tax reform and on the.... both on the tax credit
and the supplementary pensions. They
are doing something but it is very small...
THOMSEN: Well, if they come around to
give us the 2.5% and not on Mickey Mouse stuff, we
should be fully behind them.
VELKOULESKOU: I agree. There is a
scenario out there that they get pressured enough, that they
would... I think actually politically
for them it is possible to give on both of these things. But
they don't have any incentive and they
know that the Commission is willing to compromise,
so that is the problem. In a way we
went into this negotiation with the wrong strategy,
because we negotiated with the
Commission a minimal position and we cannot go further
and the Commission is just starting
from this one and is willing to go much further. So, that
is the problem. We didn't negotiate
with the Commission and then put to the Greeks
something much worse, we put to the
Greeks the minimum that we were willing to consider
and now the Greeks are saying
"Well we are not negotiating". I agree with your concern that
this date is bad for us because we
will get stuck as you say, so we need to think about it
when we are back.
THOMSEN: They only comfort I have is
that you cannot hang out there forever. You will have to
wrap it up before the spring meetings.
VELKOULESKOU: Yeah, we need an
agreement with the Europeans of an exit date. We need to
make it very
explicit with the Europeans and with the Greeks, before we go back.
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